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COMMENTS
THE TREND TOWARD ELIMINATION OF GOVERN-
MENTAL IMMUNITY IN ILLINOIS
On May 22, 1959, a decision by the Illinois Supreme Court led many to
believe that the almost sacred rule of law-governmental tort immunity-
was dead. Mr. Justice Klingbiel, in giving the opinion of the Court, stated:
"We conclude that the rule of school district tort immunity is unjust,
unsupported by any valid reason, and has no rightful place in modern
day society."'
The case was Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit School District No.
302.2 It was hailed by many as the beginning of the end of the entire
doctrine of sovereign immunity for governmental agencies. 3 However,
the celebration was short-lived. The Illinois General Assembly passed
five bills which were signed by the Governor, thereby settling the ques-
tion. The Chicago Park District,4 park districts organized under the Park
District Code,5 counties" and forest preserve districts7 were given full
immunity in tort cases. A separate bill gave public school districts and
private schools operated by religious, charitable or eleemosynary insti-
'Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit School District No. 302, Docket 35249,
Agenda 32, Illinois (1959).
2 Ibid. Thomas Molitor, a minor, by his father as next friend, brought this action
alleging negligence of defendant due to negligence of school bus driver in a bus accident.
Plaintiff was a pupil in defendant school district. The complaint contained no allegation
of insurance or other non-public funds out of which a judgment could be satisfied al-
though the abstract of the record showed $20,000-$100,000 insurance carried by the de-
fendant. The trial court sustained the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint and
judgment was entered. Plaintiff chose to stand on his complaint and attempted a direct
appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court on constitutional issues, but appeal was denied and
the case transferred to the Appellate Court, Second District. The Appellate court af-
firmed the trial court and the case again came before the supreme court on a certificate
of importance. The supreme court reversed and remanded with instructions that school
districts were no longer immune from suit in tort cases and explicitly overruled all
prior decisions to the contrary. Two justices dissented without an opinion.
8 1. S. B. A., Trial Briefs, Civil Practice and Procedure, Vol. IV, No. 12 (June 1959);
I.S.B.A, Newsletter, School Law, Vol. III, No. 3 (May 1959).
4 H.B. 1605, signed by Governor on July 22, 1959 which will become Ill. Rev. Star.
c. 105, § 333.2a.
5 S.B. 1005, 1006; signed by Governor on July 7, 1959.
6 H.B. 1638, signed by Governor on July 22, 1959 which will become Ill. Rev. Stat.
c. 34, § 22.1.
7 H.B. 1640, signed by Governor on July 22, 1959 which will be Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 57J,
§ 3a.
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tutions a tort recovery limitation on personal injuries or property damage
in the amount of $10,000, or insurance coverage, whichever is greater.8
It is interesting to note that the limitation on liability for schools did
not extend to death actions and this leads to the conclusion that the
schools are to be held liable under the Kaneland decision in these death
actions.
THE PAST
Mr. Justice Klingbiel's opinion is a scholarly discourse pointing out the
history of the concept; its illogical place in Illinois law; the great weight
of writings criticizing the concept; and a rebuttal of the usual arguments
for maintenance of the theory.9 It was pointed out that the theory seems
to stem from the English case of Russell v. Men of Devon' ° decided in
1788, which held that the action brought against the entire population
of the county would not lie. Its theory was thq lack of corporate funds
out of which satisfaction could be obtained.
In Hargrove v. Towm of Cocoa Beach," the Florida Court, in 1957,
abolished the theory of sovereign immunity of a muncipality, pointing
out that the Devon case did not involve a governmental agency or quasi-
municipal corporation, but rather a suit against all the people of the
county jointly. The Florida Court further weakened the force of the
Devon case by directing attention to the fact that the case was decided
several years after the Declaration of Independence and really has no
place in our law. The Devon case and the entire theory of sovereign
immunity stem from the medieval concept of "the King can do no
wrong," or the "Divine Right of Kings." Both the Florida decision and
the Kaneland case stressed the fact that this archaic theory seems to run
directly contra to the entire system of republican government as epito-
mized by the constitutions of both states as well as the Federal Consti-
tution. The Illinois Constitution guarantees to all those wronged an
opportunity for a redress of grievances 12 and sovereign immunity ma-
terially restricts this constitutionally guaranteed right. Why did this
anachronism creep into our Law? From whence did the anomaly spring?
In Illinois, the courts first adopted the Devon ruling and expanded it
8 H.B. 1615, signed by the Governor on July 22, 1959.
9 The main arguments for sovereign immunity appear to be: First, lack of funds ear-
marked for payment of judgments, Love v. Glencoe Park Dist., 270 l11. App. 117 (1933);
and second, the agency theory of immunity of the state as a sovereign devolving on the
quasi-municipal corporation as a government agency. Lake County v. Cuneo, 344 I11.
App. 242, 100 N.E.2d 521 (1951).
10 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
1196 So. 2d 130 (Fla., 1957).
12 Ill. Const. (1870) Art. II, § 13, 17, 19.
COMMENTS
to sovereign immunity in the 1870 case of Toum of Waltham v. Kemper13
and applied it to schools in Kinnare v. City of Chicago14 in 1898. These
cases were decided squarely on the sovereignty of a state extending to
its agencies. Further application of sovereign immunity along with other,
more cogent reasons for the concept appeared in Leviton v. Board of
Education'5 and Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consolidated School
District.'6 It is interesting to note that in England as early as 1890, the
concept was discarded. 17 Illinois and the other states, though, slavishly
followed this doctrine.18 Some states found that the concept was not
only unjust but unwise and began whittling down by legislation that
which the courts refused to abolish by reason.19 New York has long
held that school districts are liable for torts generally and for their own
negligence. 20 However, the general rule remained that a school district
or similar governmental agency was immune from tort liability unless
such liability was specifically imposed by statute and the immunity ex-
tended to acts committed by agents of the governmental agency.21
18 55 1l. 346 (1870).
14171111. 3332, 49 N.E, 536 (1898).
15 374 Ill. 594, 30 N.E.2d 497 (1940); lack of funds out of which judgments could be
satisfied.
16 348 Ill. App. 567, 109 N.E.2d 636 (1952).
17Crisp v. Thomas, 63 L. T. Rep., N. S. 756 (1890).
Is Baker & Co. v. Lagaly, 144 F.2d 344 (C.A. 10th, 1944); Bingham v. Bd. of Education
of Ogden City, 118 Utah 582, 223 P.2d 432 (1950); Reed v. Rhea County, 189 Tenn.
247, 225 S.W.2d 49 (1949); Briscoe v. School Dist. No. 123, 32 Wash.2d 353, 201 P.2d
697 (1949); Farmer v. Poultry School Dist., 113 Vt. 147, 30 A.2d 89 (1943); Wallace
v. Laurel County Bd. of Education, 287 Ky. 454, 153 S.W.2d 915 (1941); Shirkey v.
Keokuk County, 225 Iowa 1159, 281 N.W. 837 (1938); School Dist. No. 28 v. Denver
Pressed Brick, 91 Colo. 288, 14 P.2d 487 (1932); Benton v. Bd. of Education of Cumber-
land County, 201 N.C. 653, 161 S.E. 96 (1931).
19 Heiden v. Milwaukee, 226 Wis. 92, 275 N.W. 922 (1937); Huff v. Compton City
Grammar School Dist., 92 Cal. App. 44, 267 Pac. 918 (1928); Redfield v. School Dist.
No. 3, 48 Wash. 85, 92 Pac. 770 (1907).
20Lessin v. Bd. Education of City of N.Y., 247 N.Y. 503, 161 N.E. 160 (1928);
Herman v. Bd. of Education of Union School Dist. No. 8, 234 N.Y. 196, 137 N.E. 24
(1922); Titusville Iron Co. v. City of New York, 20 N.Y. 203, 100 N.E. 806 (1912);
Wahrman v. Bd. of Education, 187 N.Y. 3 31, 80 N.E. 192 (1907).
21 Jensen v. Juul, 66 S.D. 1, 278 N.W. 6 (1938); Perkins v. Trask, 95 Mont. 1, 23 P.2d
982 (1933); Boice v. Bd. of Education, II W.Va. 95, 160 S.E. 566 (1931); Turk v.
County Bd. of Education, 222 Ala. 177, 131 So. 436 (1930); Antin v. Union Dist, 130 Ore.
461, 280 Pac. 664 (1929); Consolidated School Dist. No. 1 v. Wright, 128 Okla. 193, 261
Pac. 953 (1927); McVey v. Houston, 273 S.W. 313 (Tex. Civ., 1925); Dick v. Bd. of
Education, 209 Mo. App. 63, 238 S.W. 1073 (1922); Gold v. Baltimore, 137 Md. 335,
112 Ad. 588 (1921); Juul v. School Dist., 168 Wis. 111, 169 N.W. 309 (1918); Daniels
v. Bd. of Education, 191 Mich. 339, 158 N.W. 23 (1916); Ernst v. West Covington, 116
Ky. 850, 76 S.W. 1089 (1903); Howard v. Worcester, 153 Mass. 426, 27 N.E. 11 (1891);
Ford v. School Dist. of Kendall Borough, 121 Pa. 543, 15 Adt. 812 (1888).
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School districts have been classified as quasi-municipal corporations or
governmental agencies as distinguished from pure municipal corpora-
tions. Immunity is extended to the quasi-municipal corporation almost in
toto22 while the municipal corporation's functions were classified either
governmental or proprietary. 23 Liability was imposed upon the munici-
pal corporations when the tort arose from a proprietary function.
24
THE PRESENT
In the Kaneland case, the Court stated that the question of school
district immunity had not been questioned thoroughly in almost fifty
years and therefore the decision is a very fresh and long needed recon-
ciling of modem needs to modern law. The Florida decision 25 was pre-
ceded by two very vigorous dissents in cases handed down a few years
earlier. 26 Florida took the approach that it had departed soon after its
entrance into the Union from the correct law and was'now merely
aligning itself with what was, in reality, a true exposition of the law.
Perhaps the best reason for the abolition of the sovereign immunity
doctrine was voiced by Dean Harno who said:
A Municipal corporation today is an active and virile creature capable of in-
flicting much harm. Its civil responsibility should be co-extensive. The munici-
pal corporation looms up definitely and emphatically in our law, and what is
more, it can and does commit wrongs. This being so, it must assume the re-
sponsibilities of the position it occupies in society.27
The Kaneland case is up for rehearing before the Illinois Supreme
Court and a reaffirmation of the decision will serve as an indication of
the determination of the court to stand fast in the face of the legislative
indication that it favors immunity. 28 With such cogent reasons for the
22 Lake County v. Cuneo, 344 LII. App. 242, 100 N.E.2d 521 (1951); Le Pitre v. Chi-
cago Park Dist., 374 Ill. 184, 29 N.E.2d 81 (1940); Backer v. West Chicago Park Comm.,
66 Ill. App. 507 (1896).
23 Roumbos v. City of Chicago, 332 I11. 70, 163 N.E. 361 (1928).
24 Ibid., at 77, 364 where the court said: "If the tort is one for which the municipality
is expressly made liable by statute, that fact, of course, concludes the liability of the cor-
poration. If such is not the case then the tort must consist (in the case of public cor-
porations other than public quasi corporations) of the violation of a private duty im-
posed for private corporate advantage, and not of a public or governmental duty im-
posed for the benefit of the public at large. In the case of public quasi corporations the
general rule is that they are liable only for those torts for which the statute expressly
prescribes that they shall be liable."
25 Hargrove v. Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla., 1957).
26 Villiams v. Green Cove Springs, 65 So.2d 56 (Fla., 1953); Miami v. Bethel, 65
So.2d 34 (Fla., 1953).
27 4 111. L. Q. 28, 42 (1921).
28 Auth. cited footnotes 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, supra.
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abolition of the doctrine, a reaffirmation seems to be the most sound
and logical approach.
THE FUTURE
What about the constitutionality of the legislation again giving full
or partial immunity to schools, counties, park districts and forest pre-
serves? 29 Does this legislation meet the tests of the Illinois Constitution
which guarantees redress of grievances?30 Other constitutional guaranties
have been jealously guarded by the courts, notably the right to be secure
against assaults on reputation.3 1 Should not this very basic right, one upon
which our entire judicial system is based, be as militantly upheld?
Assuming for a minute that the court will some time in the future
hold the recent legislation unconstitutional, what would result? A rash of
suits? Bankruptcy of small governmental agencies similar to school dis-
tricts? The court in the Kaneland case succinctly discredits the question
of bankruptcy by pointing out that schools are big business and, further,
municipalities and private corporations have not gone out of business as
a result of satisfying judgments rendered against them. Another author
has pointed out several ways to deal with the suits which would result
from an abolition of tort immunity and safeguard the public interest at
the same time. It was suggested that claims be excluded from jury deter-
mination; that maximum recovery limits, similar to workmen's compen-
sation claims, be established; that claims be administered by a separate
state agency instead of placing the load of such newly sanctioned claims
on the already overcrowded courts; and that special procedures be intro-
duced to permit the funding of the resulting liabilities or their payment
over a period of years.32
Still another solution pointed out by many authors is the use of tort
liability insurance as a basis for a more liberal compensation for injuries.3
Of course, Illinois has followed the theory that the procurement of liability
insurance acts as a type of waiver of immunity; but the Kaneland case
points up the rule that hitherto the fact of insurance had to be alleged
by the plaintiff before the waiver would be operative.
3 4
29 Ibid.
30111. Const. (1870) Art. II, S§ 13, 17.
31 III. Const. (1870) Art. II, S 19.
32 David, Tort Liability of Local Government-Alternatives to Immunity from Lia-
bility or Suit, 6 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1 (January 1959).
3 3 Phillips, Tort Liability of Quasi Corporations in Pennsylvania, 32 Temp. L. Q. 1
(Fall 1958).
34 Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit School District No. 32, Docket 25249,
Agenda 32, Illinois (1959).
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CONCLUSION
The entire question of immunity may be relegated to a position of no
significance if upon rehearing the court decides to withdraw or change
its prior decision. The purpose of this paper is solely to point up the over-
whelming opinion of scholars and the trend of the states-to do away with
the old theory. If the reader's curiosity is kindled, a reading of the Kane-
land case will lead him to innumerable authorities whose discussion of the
problem is too copious and lengthy for this paper.
MOVIE CENSORSHIP STANDARDS UNDER
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
With the advent of a multitude of moving pictures with prurient
overtones heralded by a spicy variety of come-hither advertising, there
is much concern as to what type of censorship is acceptable to the Supreme
Court of the United States. Quite unlike the poem by Stoddard King,
the movies do not arrive equipped with an asterisk.'
To the present day the Supreme Court has struck down such standards
as "best interests," "immoral," "tend to corrupt morals," "harmful," and
"alluringly portrays adultery as proper behavior." The problem of censor-
ship then is twofold. First, a standard acceptable to the United States
Supreme Court must be determined and second, an attempt must be made
to define the extent of allowable censorship, if any exists.
The first case to be considered in a review of censorship case law is
Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio,2 decided in 1915 wherein the Supreme Court
of the United States for the first time ruled on movie censorship. This
decision was'to remain the law of the land until 1952. The statute involved
in this case stated: "Only such films as are in the judgment and discretion
of the board of censors of a moral, educational or amusing and harmless
character shall be passed and approved by such board."3' The most impor-
tant contention of the plaintiffs so far as this discussion is concerned was
that the censorship violated the constitutional guarantees of Freedom of
Speech in both the United States and Ohio Constitutions. The Court in
upholding the statute under the Ohio Constitution, said:
1 "A writer owned an Asterisk, and kept it in his den,
Where he wrote tales (which had large sales) Of Frail and erring men,
And always, when he reached the point where carping censors lurk,
He called upon the Asterisk to do his dirty work."
"The Writer and the Asterisk," The Desk Drawer Anthology, compiled by Alice
Roosevelt Longworth and Theodore Roosevelt, Doubleday, Doran & Co., pp. 416
(1931).
2'236 U.S. 230 (1915).
3 Ibid., at 240.
